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LEFKOWITZ V. NEWSOME: THE SUPREME
COURT TAKES ANOTHER LOOK AT GUILTY
PLEAS
The attention given to criminal law by the Supreme Court in
recent years has often involved guilty pleas and federal habeas corpus
relief. Although the federal courts initially issued writs of habeas
corpus ad subjicienduml only if the trial court lacked jurisdiction,
2
the scope of inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings has long exceeded
merely jurisdictional questions.' The writ is now granted to any per-
son who is in custody4 in violation of his constitutional rights,
5 unless
I There are other forms of habeas corpus, see generally 3 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *129-31, but only ad subjiciendum concerns the legality of the detention
of the petitioner. For a history of state habeas corpus, see Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the
States-1776-1865, 32 U. Cm. L. REv. 243 (1965). Federal habeas corpus was not made
available to state prisoners until 1867. Act of February 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat.
385.
2 Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830). See also Ex parte Kearney, 20
U.S. (7 Wheat.) 38 (1822).
2 The history of the expansion of habeas corpus relief has been variously inter-
preted. In Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 404 (1963), Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking for
the Court, noted: "Nor is it true that at common law habeas corpus was available only
to inquire into the jurisdiction, in a narrow sense, of the committing court." He urged
that habeas corpus was "available to remedy any kind of governmental restraint con-
trary to fundamental law." Id. at 405. Justice Brennan also stated that the decision
in Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830), may have turned on a narrow view
of the Court's original jurisdiction, rather than a restrictive view of the availability of
the writ, and that, in any event, Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873), marked
a return to the broad availability of habeas corpus to redress restraint contrary to
fundamental law. 372 U.S. at 407-08. Mr. Justice Harlan, however, stated in Fay that
prior to 1915 the federal courts examined " only the jurisdiction of the sentencing
tribunal." 372 U.S. at 450 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Moreover,
from 1915 until the decision of Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), the federal courts
would examine only whether the petitioner had been given a fair opportunity to litigate
his claim in the state courts, in addition to the traditional jurisdictional inquiry. Id.
Mr. Justice Powell, concurring in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 252 (1973),
referred to the Court's historical interpretation in Fay as "revisionist." He stated that
"recent scholarship has cast grave doubt on Fay's version of the writ's historic func-
tion." Id. at 253.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1970) requires that a person be "in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court" before a federal court may entertain a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus. The custody requirement is liberally construed. See, e.g., Hensley
v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345 (1973), where the Court held that releasing a prisoner
on his own recognizance prior to sentencing was sufficient "custody."
5 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1970) states that the writ will not be granted unless the
petitioner is "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States." The requirements for federal habeas corpus are set out in 28 U.S.C.
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he has deliberately bypassed the remedial procedures available in the
state courts. Since the writ has evolved into a "roving commission
of inquiry"' into possible violations of individual rights, the Court
often has examined the constitutional aspects of guilty pleas in the
context of federal habeas corpus relief.
By pleading guilty, an accused waives his privilege against self-
incrimination" and his rights to trial and to confront witnesses;9 a
guilty plea, therefore, like all waivers of constitutional rights, must
be voluntary and intelligent.'0 After the accused pleads guilty, he
generally may attack only the voluntary and intelligent character of
his plea." Thus, subsequent constitutional challenge to proceedings
antecedent to the plea is normally barred.' 2 In Lefkowitz v.
Newsome,'3 however, the Supreme Court announced an exception to
the general rule that a valid guilty plea bars federal habeas corpus
relief: when a defendant, pursuant to state law, pleads guilty without
waiving his right to state appellate review of unsuccessful pretrial
§§ 2241-2255 (1970). To invoke federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, a state prisoner
must be in custody, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1970); he must have exhausted the reme-
dies available to him in the state courts, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1970); and he must allege
that his custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1970). The prisoner is required to exhaust only those
remedies currently available to him in the state courts. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 435
(1963).
1 If the petitioner has deliberately bypassed state remedies the federal district
judge, in his discretion, may deny relief. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963). Denial
of relief under these circumstances is not founded upon any constitutional or statutory
requirement, but is an exercise of "comity" between federal and state courts. Id. at
418-19, 436-37.
Id. at 469 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
Id.; Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969).
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). The essence of a plea of guilty,
and the "foundation for entering judgment against the defendant[,] is the defendant's
admission in open court that he committed the acts charged in the indictment." Id.
Although the defendant's admission is "central to the plea and the foundation for
entering judgment," id., the Supreme Court in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25,
37 (1970), held that "while most pleas of guilty consist of both a waiver of trial and an
express admission of guilt, the latter elememt is not a constitutional requisite to the
imposition of crimimal penalty." Much of the importance of a guilty plea stems from
the fact that "it is itself a conviction," and once it is accepted "the court has nothing
to do but give judgment and sentence." Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223
(1927).
" Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973).
' Id.
13 420 U.S. 283 (1975).
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motions to suppress, he also preserves his right to review of these
issues through federal habeas corpus.
Newsome was arrested in the lobby of a New York City apartment
house for loitering."4 When a search incident to his arrest yielded a
small quantity of heroin and several hypodermic instruments, New-
some was also charged with possession of a dangerous drug15 and
criminal possession of a hypodermic instrument." He was subse-
quently convicted of loitering. At the pretrial suppression hearing on
the drug charge, Newsome argued that the arresting officer lacked
probable cause to make the loitering arrest, that there was insuffi-
cient evidence to support the loitering conviction, and that the loiter-
ing statute was unconstitutional and could support neither the loiter-
ing conviction nor the search incident to his arrest. 7 The New York
City Criminal Court, however, denied the motion to suppress. New-
some then withdrew his plea of not guilty, pleaded guilty to the lesser
charge of attempted possession of dangerous drugs, 8 and was sent-
enced to ninety days confinement. 9
In accordance with New York procedure which permits suspects
to plead guilty and still preserve claims of unauthorized search and
seizure for appellate review, 2' Newsome appealed the denial of his
motion to suppress. The Appellate Term of the New York Supreme
Court reversed the loitering conviction but sustained the drug convic-
tion.2 ' Leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was denied,





" Id. Imposition of Newsome's sentence was stayed pending appeal; he was never
imprisoned under the sentence. United States ex rel. Newsome v. Malcolm, 492 F.2d
1166, 1169 (2d Cir. 1974).
" N.Y. CODE CrIM. PROC. § 813-c, now recodified as N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW §§
710.20(1), 710.70(2) (McKinney 1971). Similarly, appeals from denials of motions to
suppress allegedly coerced confessions can be made under N.Y. CrM. Pno. LAW §§
710.20(3), 710.70(2) (McKinney 1971), and appeals from denials of motions to suppress
identifications claimed to be improper may be made under N.Y. CraM. PRO. LAW §§
710.20(5), 710.70(2) (McKinney 1971). California and Wisconsin also permit appeal
after a guilty plea. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5(m) (West 1970); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
971.31(10) (1971).
21 420 U.S. at 285. The Appellate Term upheld the drug conviction on the ground
that since there was probable cause to arrest Newsome, the drugs and paraphernalia
were the fruits of a search incident to a lawful arrest. Id. The Appellate Term disposed
of Newsome's appeal by issuing a summary order which did not address the constitu-
tional claims. United States ex rel. Newsome v. Malcolm, 492 F.2d 1166, 1169 n.3 (2d
Cir. 1974).
1976]
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as was a petition for a writ of certiorari." Newsome then sought
habeas corpus relief in federal court, arguing that the New York
loitering law was unconstitutional, that his arrest was therefore ille-
gal, and that the evidence seized during the search incident to his
arrest should have been suppressed.? After an initial dismissal, the
district court issued the writ.24 When the Second Circuit affirmed,2
the Attorney General of New York petitioned for a writ .of certiorari.
The Supreme Court granted the petition,"6 limited to the question of
whether Newsome's guilty plea waived federal habeas corpus relief
notwithstanding the availability of state appellate review.2 7 In a five-
to-four decision, the Court held that under these circumstances a plea
of guilty would not foreclose federal habeas corpus relief.
The rule that a voluntary and intelligent guilty plea generally bars
later habeas corpus attack on pre-plea proceedings was developed in
the "guilty plea trilogy" of Brady v. United States,2 McMann v.
Newsome v. New York, 405 U.S. 908 (1972).
420 U.S. at 286.
24 The district court initially dismissed the writ because Newsome was not in
custody. Id. at 286 n.2. Newsome appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit which remanded the cause for a decision on the merits in view of the Supreme
Court's decision in Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345 (1973). See note 4 supra.
On remand, after the New York Court of Appeals had declared the loitering law
unconstitutional in People v. Berck, 32 N.Y.2d 567, 300 N.E.2d 411, 347 N.Y.S.2d 33,
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973), the district court issued the writ.
2 United States ex rel. Newsome v. Malcolm, 492 F.2d 1166 (2d Cir. 1974).
m Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 417 U.S. 967 (1974). The Court granted the petition
because of a conflict between decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
and the Second Circuit. In McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770 n.13 (1970), the
Supreme Court expressly reserved decision on the question of whether federal habeas
corpus review was foreclosed when a state permits an appeal from a conviction based
on a guilty plea. In Mann v. Smith, 488 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
932 (1974), the Ninth Circuit held that the Supreme Court's decision in Tollett v.
Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973), overruled the reservation in McMann. In United
States ex reL Newsome v. Malcolm, 492 F.2d 1166 (2d Cir. 1974), the Second Circuit
noted the decision in Mann v. Smith, but did not reach the same result. Since the
Supreme Court decision in Tollett did not specifically overrule the reservation set out
in McMann, the Second Circuit did not "undertake the hazardous task of elevating
silence to the level of stare decisis." 492 F.2d at 1171 (emphasis in original). The
Second Circuit has held in other cases that federal habeas corpus review is not fore-
closed under the New York guilty plea system. United States ex rel. Daneff v. Hender-
son, 501 F.2d 1180 (2d Cir. 1974); United States ex rel. Stephen J.B. v. Shelly, 430
F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1970); United States ex rel. Molloy v. Follette, 391 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 391 U.S. 917 (1968); United States ex rel. Rogers v. Warden, 381 F.2d
209 (2d Cir. 1967).
420 U.S. at 287 n.4.
u 397 U.S. 742 (1970). In Brady, the defendant, while represented by counsel,
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Richardson, 2 and Parker v. North Carolina,3 and refined in Tollett
v. Henderson.3 ' Prior to these decisions, the Court had viewed chal-
lenges to convictions based on guilty pleas as questioning only the
voluntariness and intelligence of the pleas;32 the challenges had not
been based on constitutional infirmities which had preceded the
guilty plea. The Brady trilogy and Tollett, however, presented the
changed his plea from not guilty of kidnapping to guilty when a co-defendant pleaded
guilty and became available to testify against him. Brady later petitioned for federal
collateral relief, claiming that his plea was involuntary, and asserting as one of the
grounds for his petition that the possibility of receiving the death penalty, had he gone
to trial, coerced his plea. Congress deleted the death penalty provision of the kidnap-
ping statute after it was declared unconstitutional in United States v. Jackson, 390
U.S. 570 (1968). Act of Oct. 24, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-539, Title I, § 1201, 86 Stat. 1072,
amending 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (Supp. II,
1973)).
29 397 U.S. 759 (1970). In McMann, three convicts sought on federal habeas corpus
to attack their convictions on the ground that coerced confessions caused their guilty
pleas. The standards which New York used to determine the voluntariness of the
confessions in McMann were declared unconstitutional in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S.
368 (1964).
397 U.S. 790 (1970). In Parker, the petitioner, after pleading guilty to a charge
of first degree burglary, sought state collateral relief claiming that his plea was the
product of a coerced confession, that the indictment to which he pleaded guilty was
invalid because of unconstitutional racial exclusion in the selection of the grand jury,
and that his plea was involuntary because North Carolina statutes then in effect
allowed defendants to plead guilty and thus avoid the possibility of capital punishment
on conviction after trial. Parker was the only one of the guilty plea trilogy which did
not involve federal habeas corpus relief.
3' 411 U.S. 258 (1973). In Tollett, the defendant asserted that his murder convic-
tion based on a guilty plea was invalid because of unconstitutional racial exclusion in
the selection of the grand jury. The Court rejected the defendant's argument, and held
that even if a criminal defendant could prove that the indictment to which he pleaded
guilty was returned by an unconstitutionally selected grand jury, and even if at the
time of his plea neither the defendant nor his attorney knew of this failing, the defen-
dant would not be entitled to federal collateral relief. Id. at 266. Furthermore, the
Court in Tollett expressly stated that the finality of a guilty plea was not founded on
the procedural concept of waiver. Id. at 267. The Court did not, however, further
develop what other concepts were involved.
2 "The requirement that a plea of guilty must be intelligent and voluntary to be
valid has long been recognized." Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747 n.4 (1970).
These standards evolved in a series of cases from Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S.
220, 223 (1927), where the Court premised the importance of the voluntary and intelli-
gent requirements on the fact that a guilty plea "is itself a conviction," to Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969), where the Court developed the requirement that
the record must show that a valid waiver of the sixth amendment right to trial by jury
occurred. See Brady v. United States, supra at 748 nn. 5 & 6 and cases cited therein.
1976]
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Court with claims that concerned antecedent constitutional depriva-
tion .
33
In all four cases, the Court refused to address the merits of the
constitutional claim and sustained the convictions because the guilty
pleas were found to have been both voluntary
34 and intelligent.3
Since a guilty plea is "a break in the chain of events which has
preceded it in the criminal process," once a defendant has pleaded
guilty "he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the
deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry
of the guilty plea. ' 3 Therefore, a defendant who has pleaded guilty
normally may attack his conviction only by proving that his plea was
involuntary or unintelligent7.3  Claims of antecedent constitutional
deprivation may be used only to challenge the intelligence of the plea
by evaluating the advice rendered by the defendant's counsel. 8
The Supreme Court's refusal to grant habeas corpus relief in
Tollett and the Brady trilogy could have provided a sufficient doc-
trinal basis to foreclose the availability of such relief to the defendant
in Lefkowitz. 31 The Court, however, rejected contentions that the
See notes 28-31 supra.
", The voluntariness of a guilty plea is determined from "all of the relevant cir-
cumstances surrounding it." Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749 (1970). Thus,
the possibility of a more severe sentence upon conviction following a trial is but one
factor in examining the validity of the guilty plea. Id. Even if the possibility of a
heavier sentence is the "but for" cause of the plea, the guilty plea still will not neces-
sarily be involuntary. Id. at 750.
1 The touchstone for determining the intelligence of a plea is the advice of coun-
sel. If a defendant's guilty plea is based on advice which is "within the range of
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases," the plea is intelligent. McMann
v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970). The conviction may not be challenged on the
ground that counsel misjudged the admissibility of incriminating evidence by failing
to foresee future court decisions that, if in effect at the time of the guilty plea, would
have led to its withdrawal. Id. at 770-71. The defendant's counsel need only provide
advice based upon the law existing at the time of the plea. Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742, 757 (1970). Once a defendant pleads guilty, therefore, "[hie may only
attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the
advice he received from counsel was not within the standards ['demanded of attorneys
in criminal cases']." Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973).
"' Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973).
37 Id.
3 Id.
"' Under the Tollett-Brady trilogy decisions, federal collateral relief is unavailable
to a defendant who has voluntarily and intelligently pleaded guilty. Newsome never
claimed that his plea was entered involuntarily. Brief for Respondent at 13 n.5, Lef-
kowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975); neither did Newsome claim that his plea was
unintelligent. His guilty plea "plainly qualifies" as voluntary and intelligent. 420 U.S.
at 299 (White, J., dissenting).
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Brady trilogy and Tollett were controlling. Observing that a question
analogous to that under consideration in Lefkowitz had been ex-
pressly left open in McMann," the Court noted that due to the special
nature of a guilty plea under New York procedure, there was an
exception to the general rule that a voluntary and intelligent guilty
plea bars federal habeas corpus relief.4' Because in most states appel-
late review is available only to defendants who proceed to trial, the
Lefkowitz majority reasoned that "[a] defendant who chooses to
plead guilty rather than go to trial in effect deliberately refuses to
present his federal claims to the state court in the first instance.
' 52
In addition, the Court found that when a "defendant chooses to by-
pass the orderly procedure for litigating his constitutional claims...
the State acquires a legitimate expectation of finality in the convic-
tion thereby obtained. 4 3 This expectation of finality, observed the
Court, is the "break in the chain of events" to which the Court re-
ferred in Tollett.Y1
The Lefkowitz majority then compared the notions of bypass and
finality, which normally accompany a guilty plea, with the special
circumstances that accompany a plea made under the New York
procedure. By permitting a defendant to plead guilty and still appeal
the denial of a pretrial motion, New York asserts no right to the
finality of a conviction based on a plea of guilty."' The Court deter-
mined that since a defendant may appeal his constitutional claims,
"[a]s to those claims, therefore, there is no 'break' at all in the usual
state procedure for adjudicating constitutional issues."" Thus, the
Court concluded that a guilty plea under New York's procedure did
not have the characteristics of bypass and finality which usually
accrue from a guilty plea."
If Newsome's plea were unintelligent or involuntary, the Court could easily have
decided the case on this narrow ground alone, rather than exploring other reasons for
granting him relief.
,1 The Court in McMann v. Richardson stated, "We do not here consider whether
a conviction, based on a plea of guilty entered in a State permitting the defendant
pleading guilty to challenge on appeal the admissibility of his confession . . . would
be open to attack in federal habeas corpus proceedings on the grounds that the confes-
sion was coerced." 397 U.S. at 770 n.13.
1" 420 U.S. at 288.
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The Supreme Court also based its decision in Lefkowitz on the
expectations of the state and defendant under the New York guilty
plea system, and the supposed effects which would follow from a
denial of federal habeas corpus relief. Since the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit had held that federal collateral relief was not
precluded by a guilty plea in New York,4" the Lefkowitz majority
presumed that denying Newsome relief "would make New York's law
a trap for the unwary."49 The Court noted that New York's expecta-
tions also supported the availability of habeas corpus relief. Because
defendants were permitted under state procedure to plead guilty, yet
still appeal the denial of pretrial motions, the Court found that New
York's expectations differed materially from those of states where a
guilty plea forecloses further litigation, on the merits." In the major-
ity's view, New~ome's guilty plea was merely a procedure through
which the constitutional issues may be litigated without the burden
of trial." The plea was entered with the expectation that it would
"not foreclose judicial review of the merits of the alleged constitu-
tional violations." 2 This judicial review, the Court stated, necessarily
included federal habeas corpus relief.53 Furthermore, the Court was
concerned that a denial of habeas relief to Newsome "would eviscer-
ate New York's commendable efforts to relieve the problem of cong-
ested criminal trial calendars."'" "Because of the entirely different
expectations surrounding Newsome's plea and the completely differ-
ent legal consequences flowing from it," the Court held that the
Brady trilogy and Tollett decisions were "simply inapposite."55 Ac-
cordingly, the Court focused on Newsome's and New York's expecta-
tions and not on the voluntariness or intelligence of his guilty plea.
The Court's reliance on the expectations present in Lefkowitz,
however, is questionable .5 Newsome's personal expectations would
48 Newsome pleaded guilty on May 7, 1970. At that time the Second Circuit had
twice held that federal habeas corpus relief was available under the New York guilty
plea procedure. See note 26 supra.
' 420 U.S. at 293 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 289.
' Id. at 289-90.
52 Id. at 290 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 290 n.6. See notes 85 & 88 infra.
420 U.S. at 293.
Id. at 291.
51 Why either the defendant's or New York's expectations should be relevant to
determining if the defendant's custody is "in violation of the Constitution," 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(3) (1970), is not readily apparent, unless frustrating those expectations some-
how would violate the fourteenth amendment. This potentiality, however, was not
discussed by the Court.
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seem to have been satisfied by the effects of his guilty plea. Newsome
received state appellate review of his pretrial motion to suppress
notwithstanding his plea. He also may have elected to plead guilty
to a lesser offense in order to avoid the possibility of a longer sentence
after trial,5 7 and by pleading guilty he avoided the expense and diffi-
culty of trial. 8 Furthermore, Newsome never claimed that he pleaded
guilty in reliance on the availability of federal habeas corpus under
the New York procedure. 9 Newsome's expectations thus were sub-
stantially fulfilled.
Rather than Newsome's subjective expectations, however, the
Court may have intended to focus upon the expectations that New-
some as a defendant might reasonably have as a result of the opera-
tion of the New York statute. While such an approach avoids the
difficulties inherent in evaluating Newsome's subjective intentions,"0
it is nevertheless subject to the Court's holding in Tollett which indi-
cates that a defendant's expectations, like a claim of constitutional
deprivation, should be used only to evaluate the advice of counsel.6
Discussion of Newsome's expectations, therefore, provides little sup-
port for the decision in Lefkowitz.
2
5 Although he was originally charged with possession of a dangerous drug, New-
some pleaded guilty to attempted possession. See text accompanying notes 15 & 18
supra.
r4 In Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750, 752 (1970), the Court discussed
these and other factors which can motivate a defendant to plead guilty.
5' Brief for Respondent, Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975). While New-
some expressly relied on the "post plea features" of state appellate review notwith-
standing his guilty plea, he never claimed that he relied on the availability of federal
habeas corpus under the statute. Id. at 19-20. The statute refers only to state procedure
and makes no mention of federal habeas corpus. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 813-c, now
recodified as N.Y. CiuM. PRO. LAw §§ 710.20(1), 710.70(2) (McKinney 1971).
,1 However, considering the expectations a defendant might reasonably have
under the New York statute introduces a new problem. The defendant's expectations
apparently would change depending on the state of the law at the time the defendant
elected to plead guilty. For example, the defendant who pleaded guilty after the Sec-
ond Circuit originally held that federal collateral relief was available under the New
York statute, United States ex rel. Rogers v. Warden, 381 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1967), but
before the Brady trilogy was decided, did not have to consider the effects of Supreme
Court decisions on the finality of a guilty plea. This defendant's expectation of the
effects of the law upon his plea would be different from the defendant in Lefkowitz.
Newsome pleaded guilty three days after the Brady trilogy was decided, and thus his
counsel arguably had to consider the effect of the trilogy on the previous decisions of
the Second Circuit. Likewise, a defendant's legal expectations would have changed
immediately following the Tollett decision. See text accompanying notes 34-38 supra.
" See text accompanying note 38 supra.
82 The Court's reliance on the decisions of the Second Circuit, see note 26 supra,
is misplaced. Prejudice to Newsome could easily have been avoided, as Mr. Justice
19761
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The Court's discussion of New York's expectations seems equally
misplaced. There is little evidence to support the majority's assertion
that refusing habeas corpus relief "would eviscerate [the state's]
efforts to relieve the problem of congested criminal trial calendars.
'6
3
Indeed, defendants who are innocent will likely insist on trial not-
withstanding the availability of federal collateral relief to those who
plead guilty." There will also be defendants who feel that their best
interests will be served by a guilty plea regardless of the scope and
nature of post-conviction review. More important, however, the
Court cited no evisceration of the criminal process in states which
prohibit appeals after pleas of guilty by defendants who insist on trial
merely to preserve federal review on the merits.15 Furthermore, al-
White stated in dissent, by permitting Newsome to replead. 420 U.S. at 301. Cf.
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 768-69 (1970), where the Court stated that if
the defendant's guilty plea was involuntary, the "Constitution will afford him another
chance to plead." Id. at 769. In addition, Newsome withdrew his not guilty plea and
pleaded guilty on May 7, 1970, three days after the Brady trilogy was decided. New-
some's counsel may arguably be assumed to have recommended the plea with the
knowledge of the trilogy decisions; and he, like Judge Moore of the Second Circuit
dissenting only a month later in United States ex rel. Stephen J. B. v. Shelly, 430 F.2d
215, 221 n.1 (2d Cir. 1970), may have believed the trilogy to have foreclosed attacks
on guilty pleas via habeas corpus beyond the questions of the voluntariness and intel-
ligence of the plea.
The Court included as one of Newsome's expectations the fact that he had satis-
fied the jurisdictional prerequisites for federal habeas corpus review. 420 U.S. at 291-
92. See note 5 supra. Since the defendants in Brady, McMann, and Tollett had also
satisfied the prerequisites but were nonetheless denied relief, this consideration should
be irrelevant.
420 U.S. at 293.
64 See Bishop, Waivers in Pleas of Guilty, 60 F.R.D. 513 (1974), where the author
makes the somewhat extreme statement that no sane person would ever plead guilty
if he were innocent. This position ignores the situation where the accused has reason
to believe that his conviction is assured because of pretrial publicity, adverse evidence
that he is unable to rebut, or emotional reaction to the alleged crime notwithstanding
his innocence. Upon weighing these considerations, the innocent man might well plead
.guilty to a lesser offense, or plead guilty in order to obtain a favorable sentence recom-
mendation from the prosecutor.
Although the great majority of defendants who plead guilty are actually guilty,
indisputably some are innocent. Davis, The Guilty Plea Process: Exploring the Issues
of Voluntariness and Accuracy, 6 VAL. U.L. REV. 111, 129 (1972), citing D. NEWMAN,
CONVITON: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WiTHoUT TRIAL 22 (1966).
" The Court was referring only to the evisceration of New York's efforts to de-
crease the number of criminal trials by increasing the guilty plea rate. Nevertheless,
if large numbers of defendants in New York would be dissuaded from pleading guilty
solely because a guilty plea barred federal collateral relief, as was apparently envi-
sioned by the Court, it would be expected that jurisdictions without a New York-type
guilty plea procedure would have experienced a significant decline in the rate of guilty
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though the Lefkowitz majority implied that New York expected fed-
eral habeas review to be available under the guilty plea procedure,"
Mr. Justice White's dissent noted that "[tihere is absolutely no
reason to suppose that New York intended to create such expecta-
tions."' 7 In fact, Newsome conceded that nothing in the legislative
history indicated whether the New York Legislature had intended to
make federal relief available." The Court's expectations rationale
thus fails to provide an adequate basis for distinguishing Tollett and
the Brady trilogy as "inapposite" to Lefkowitz.
Apart from the expectations rationale, there remains the Court's
proposition that the "completely different legal consequences" 9 that
followed Newsome's guilty plea require a different result from that
which would have been anticipated had the plea been analyzed in
light of the Brady trilogy and Tollett. The Court reasoned that New-
some, unlike the defendant who pleads guilty in a state which prohib-
its appeal on the merits after a guilty plea, did not "deliberately
[refuse] to present his federal claims to the state court in the first
instance."7 Thus, Newsome did not choose to bypass state proce-
dures for litigating his constitutional claims. New York, therefore,
acquired no "legitimate expectation of finality in the conviction,"
pleas. The federal courts have no such system as New York's, yet the guilty plea rate
has remained relatively constant. For example, in fiscal year 1969 86% of the defen-
dants convicted in the United States district courts were convicted on pleas of guilty.
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADImNISTRATIvE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1969, at 273 Table D-4 (1969). For fiscal
year 1973 the figure was 84%. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1973, at 402
Table D-4 (1973).
Since federal habeas corpus petitioners are rarely successful in obtaining release,
it seems unlikely that the unavailability of habeas corpus should dissuade many defen-
dants who would otherwise plead guilty. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 446 (1963)
(Clark, J., dissenting, noting that 98% of habeas corpus petitions are "frivolous").
6 See text accompanying notes 52 & 53 supra.
', 420 U.S. at 300.
65 Brief for Respondent at 12 n.4, Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975).
Newsome argued that New York's intent to make federal habeas corpus relief available
was shown by the 1971 recodification of the statutes in light of the decisions of the
Court of Appeals that habeas corpus would be available under the statutes. This is a
post hoc assumption subject to the objections of the continuing absence of any relevant
legislative history, and the probability that the Legislature repromulgated the statutes
for reasons other than court decisions it was all but powerless to change. The Legisla-
ture could just as well have acted in spite of the Second Circuit decisions as because
of them.
" 420 U.S. at 291.
o Id. at 289.
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and there was no "break in the chain of events" as there was in
Tollett.7' The Court held that Newsome had preserved his cause for
federal collateral review by presenting his claim to the state courts.
While the majority's analysis of the plea's consequences has some
appeal, it fails to dispose adequately of all objections. Instead of
considering how a New York defendant preserves his claim for federal
review, as the Court did, the issue should be restated to ask why
defendants who plead guilty under procedures different from New
York's are denied federal habeas corpus relief. Contrary to the Court's
assertion, the bar effect can not result from the fact that a "defendant
who chooses to plead guilty in effect deliberately refuses to present
his federal claims to the state court. '7 3 For example, although the
defendant in Tollett pleaded guilty, he, could not reasonably be held
to have deliberately refused to present a claim of which neither he
nor his attorney was aware. 74 In Brady, the defendant could not have
deliberately refused to present a claim that did not exist at the time
he pleaded guilty." It would appear that while Newsome's guilty plea
7' Id.
"Id. at 291-92.
'3 Id. If the test for determining whether a voluntary and intelligent guilty plea
bars later federal habeas corpus relief is now whether the defendant has presented his
federal claims to the state court, the Supreme Court has developed a doctrine similar
to res judicata. The claims which the defendant did not present to the state courts are
effectively merged in the state court's judgment, and the defendant is barred from
litigating them anew in the federal courts on collateral review. This is the "functional
equivalent" of res judicata. See note 88 infra. But see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 423
(1963), where the Court discussed "the familiar principle that res judicata is inapplica-
ble in habeas proceedings."
More important, however, if presenting the claim to the state court is now the test,
the general rule that a voluntary and intelligent guilty plea bars later federal collateral
relief may be engulfed by the exception established in Lefkowitz. Since the Constitu-
tion does not require states to furnish appellate review of criminal judgments, Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 21 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), a defendant who pleads
guilty only after the denial of a motion to suppress has also presented "his federal
claims to the state court in the first instance." The logical result of this test would be
that all defendants will make a pro forma motion to suppress, and thereby preserve
their claims for collateral review. Tollett and the Brady trilogy would thus be effec-
tively overruled.
" See note 31 supra.
In 1968 the Supreme Court held that the death penalty provision of the Lind-
bergh Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1970), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (Supp. ElI,
1973), was unconstitutional, United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968). In Brady,
the defendant pleaded guilty in 1959. It would have been impossible for Brady to have
contested the validity of the statute. Nevertheless, the Court in Brady held that even
if the possibility of capital punishment on conviction after trial was the "but for" cause
of the guilty plea, relief would still be foreclosed. 397 U.S. at 750.
LEFKOWITZ V. NEWSOME
was not a deliberate refusal to present his claims in state court,
neither were the guilty pleas in Brady and Tollett. Therefore, the
Court's deliberate-refusal rationale is unconvincing.
Although the majority's reasoning does not satisfactorily explain
the decision that federal collateral review remained available to New-
some notwithstanding his guilty plea, there are other arguments
which can be advanced to support the decision in Lefkowitz. The
most important of these77 is the "principle that [the Supreme] Court
will decline to review state court judgments which rest on indepen-
dent and adequate state grounds, notwithstanding the copresence of
federal grounds." The doctrine of adequate and independent state
76 The Court's contention that a defendant who pleads guilty "chooses to bypass"
the state's procedures for litigating constitutional claims, 420 U.S. at 289, is basically
the same as the "deliberate refusal" rationale, since bypass of state procedures neces-
sarily includes refusal to present a claim to the state courts. In Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391, 438 (1963), the Court held that if a defendant deliberately bypasses the state's
procedures, "the federal habeas judge may in his discretion deny relief." In the Brady
trilogy and To~lett decisions, however, the Court held that collateral relief was abso-
lutely barred to defendants who plead guilty; under those decisions the federal judge
has no discretion to grant relief. The bar effect of a valid guilty plea thus cannot
adequately be explained as a bypass of state procedures.
" Theories of comity and waiver might also justify the decision in Lefkowitz. The
case can be viewed as an unstated exercise of comity, and thus as one of many recent
Supreme Court decisions respecting the separate powers of the states. Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), is the primary example of this doctrine. See also Gibson v.
Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Samuels v.
Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971). Under this approach, the federal courts would be bound
to respect the weight the states place upon guilty pleas in their own criminal systems.
Since New York does not choose to regard guilty pleas as inviolable, neither will the
federal courts. Comity is not a constitutional requirement, however, Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391, 418-19, 436-37 (1963), and thus should not affect the granting of a writ which
is not available unless the petitioner is in custody in violation of the Constitution. 28
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1970).
The doctrine of waiver might also be argued to distinguish Newsome's plea from
the pleas in the Brady trilogy and Tollett. In Tollett, however, the Court specifically
rejected the doctrine of waiver as the sole basis for foreclosing federal habeas corpus
relief beyond the questions of the voluntariness and intelligence of the plea. 411 U.S.
at 267. Furthermore, the "classic definition" of waiver, "an intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right or privilege," Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963),
citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938), could not sustain the convictions
of the defendants in either Brady or Tollett. A defendant cannot waive a right the
law has not yet given him. See note 75 supra. Neither can a defendant waive a right
be does not know he has. See note 31 supra.
Is Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 428 (1963). If a state court judgment rests on ques-
tions of state law independent from accompanying questions of federal law, the Su-
preme Court will decline to decide the questions of federal law because they will be
moot; nothing will turn on their resolution. Id. at 429. The state grounds must not only
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grounds presents a stronger rationale for explaining the Lefkowitz
decision than any of the majority's stated grounds. Applying this
doctrine to Lefkowitz, the argument would be that a guilty plea itself
provides an adequate and independent state ground for an accused's
conviction: by pleading guilty a defendant normally does not present
his federal claim to the state courts, and the state may therefore
imprison him. Since the copresence of an adequate and independent
state ground precludes federal review of constitutional claims, a fed-
eral court would decline to review collaterally a conviction based on
a guilty plea, even if the defendant has a valid constitutional claim.
In Lefkowitz, there would thus be no adequate and independent state
ground because Newsome presented his claim to the state courts. 9
New York, therefore, could not contend that Newsome failed to con-
test his guilt 8-a failure which would have given the state an ade-
quate and independent ground for his conviction. In Fay v. Noia,5'
however, the Supreme Court severely undercut the force of the ade-
quate and independent state ground doctrine in federal habeas cor-
pus proceedings. There, the Court noted that "the adequate state-
ground rule is a function of the limitations of appellate review; 82 the
rule does not so limit collateral review. The Court further observed
that "no habeas decision has been found which expressly rests upon
[the doctrine]. Thus, to apply the rule in habeas would be to set sail
on quite unchartered seas."83 To subscribe to the doctrine of adequate
and independent state grounds as a basis for decision in the guilty
plea cases, therefore, would be inappropriate and unprecedented."
be independent, however, they must also be "adequate," that is, the state grounds
must rest "upon a fair or substantial basis." Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n, 286 U.S.
276, 282 (1932). Thus, if a state court is empowered to decide questions of federal law,
yet in its discretion refuses in one case to decide such questions although it has decided
them in others, this will not constitute an adequate state ground. Williams v. Georgia,
349 U.S. 375, 384, 389 (1955). Similarly, state court refusal to grant review because of
the defendant's failure to use the right type of paper is not an adequate state ground.
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 376 U.S. 339 (1964) (per curiam), rev'g 42 Ala.
App. 1, 149 So. 2d 921 (1962).
29 Whether Newsome presented his federal claim to a state trial or appellate court
should be irrelevant. See note 73 supra.
0 A defendant can contest his guilt either by asserting that he did not commit
the acts charged, or by admitting that he committed the crime but nevertheless is not
guilty because the state has abridged his fourteenth amendment rights. Here, New-
some admitted the attempted possession of heroin, but contested the admissibility of
the heroin on the ground that it was seized subsequent to an illegal search.
91 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
Id. at 429 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 429 n.39.
81 In Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970), the Court rejected the peti-
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Nevertheless, of all the arguments which have been considered, the
doctrine of adequate and independent state grounds provides the
least objectionable reasoning for the decision in Lefkowitz.
The propositions of state and defendant expectations, deliberate
bypass of state procedures, and refusal to present claims to the state
court relied upon by the majority in Lefkowitz, and even the ade-
quate and independent state grounds doctrine, do not satisfactorily
explain the Court's decision. That unsatisfactory explanation results
because the Brady trilogy and Tollett were not decided on procedural
views of preserving federal claims under state law; those decisions,
instead, established a "rule of substantive constitutional law limiting
the federal constitutional grounds upon which a defendant may at-
tack a judicial admission of guilt."85 Although the dissenting justices86
and the Attorney General of New York 7 based their objections to
granting Newsome relief on the ground that substantive federal law
concerning guilty pleas provided him no remedy, this objection was
tioner's argument that the indictment to which he pleaded guilty was invalid because
of unconstitutional racial exclusion in the selection of the grand jury. The Court held
that Parker's failure to raise this objection in the timely manner required by state law
would constitute an adequate state ground precluding our reaching
the grand jury issue if this case were here on direct review. See Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 428-429 (1963). We are under a similar constraint
when asked to review a state court decision holding that the same rule
of practice requires denial of collateral relief.
Id. at 798. Although the Court relied upon the presence of an adequate state ground
to deny Parker's grand jury claim, the Court distinguished the bar effect of a voluntary
and intelligent guilty plea from the doctrine of adequate state grounds. Id. at 799. The
two concepts, therefore, would seem to be independent.
11 420 U.S. at 295 (White, J., dissenting). If the bar effect of a voluntary and
intelligent guilty plea is a matter of substantive constitutional law, it should apply to
bar relief in either the direct review or habeas corpus context. Nevertheless, in
Lefkowitz the state conceded that Newsome's conviction would have been reviewable
on certiorari from the Appellate Term. Id. at 290 n.6. That the Supreme Court could
grant Newsome relief on direct review, and yet deny federal collateral relief, is not the
anomaly it seems at first blush. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1970), a court may grant
habeas corpus relief only if the petitioner's custody is "in violation of the Constitu-
tion." Congress has not so limited the Supreme Court's certiorari power to review state
court decisions. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1970). On direct review from the Appellate Term,
the Court would have been presented only with the narrow issue of Newsome's fourth
amendment claim. The constitutionality of his custody would not have been before the
Court. See also note 88 infra.
86 420 U.S. at 297 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White was joined by the Chief
Justice and Justice Rehnquist. Justice Powell filed a separate dissenting opinion in
which he concurred with Justice White's dissent.
9 Brief for Petitioner at 10, Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975).
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virtually disregarded by Mr. Justice Stewart's majority opinion." By
not considering the comparative merits of substantive and procedural
bases for the bar effect of guilty pleas, the majority in Lefkowitz
assumed that denial of relief was founded on a rule of procedure. 8
The procedural. assumption, however, has obscured the rule of
finality developed in the Brady trilogy and Tollett. Lefkowitz estab-
lishes different standards for granting federal collateral review of con-
victions based on guilty pleas in the three states that permit appeal
on the merits after a guilty plea from the forty-seven states that
prohibit appeal. Since Congress has directed that habeas corpus
The majority opinion discusses two arguments which may have been intended
to counter the contentions of the dissent and the petitioner. Since the petitioner con-
ceded that Newsome's conviction would have been reviewable on certiorari from the
decision of the Appellate Term, the Court reasoned that federal habeas corpus relief
must also be available. 420 U.S. at 290 n.6. This follows from the decision in Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 429 (1963), where the Court held that even when there is an
adequate and independent state ground which will bar direct review, federal habeas
relief will nevertheless be available. The Court in Fay stated that "[iln Noia's case
the only relevant substantive law is federal-the Fourteenth Amendment. State law
appears only in the procedural framework for adjudicating the substantive federal
question." 372 U.S. at 431. In Lefkowitz, however, the state law has substantive as well
as procedural aspects. While the New York law establishes the procedural framework
for adjudicating the substantive federal question, it also creates a new right for defen-
dants that they would not otherwise enjoy-the right to plead guilty yet still retain
the riqht to state appellate review on the merits. The Court's reliance on Fay was thus
inapposite. Cf. Flores v. Beto, 374 F.2d 225, 227 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 948
(1967), where the court held that although there might be an adequate ground for the
Supreme Court to grant a writ of certiorari, federal collateral relief would nevertheless
be denied. But see Note, Constitutional Law-Guilty Plea-Federal Habeas Corpus
Relief Available When State Statute Permits Post-Guilty Plea Appellate Review of
Constitutional Challenges, 28 VAND. L. R-V. 898, 908 (1975), where reference was made
to the "essentially procedural function of the plea in this situation." See also note 85
supra.
The Lefkowitz majority's second argument was based on the conclusion that in
terms of "functional reality," 420 U.S. at 291 n.7, there was "no meaningful difference
between Newsome's conviction and a New York conviction entered after trial." Id. at
290. According to the Court, New York could have required defendants who wished to
avoid trial to plead not guilty, but stipulate to all prosecution evidence. Upon convic-
tion, the constitutional issues would be reviewable in the state courts, and since there
was no plea of guilty, federal habeas corpus would still be available. In terms of
"functional reality," the Court reasoned that there was no difference between the two
procedures. Consequently, habeas relief should be available in both circumstances. As
Mr. Justice White pointed out, however, the Court's argument applies equally well in
states that prohibit appeal after a guilty plea. 420 U.S. at 299 n.6 (White, J., dissent-
ing).
See 420 U.S. at 295 (White, J., dissenting).
'o See note 20 supra.
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relief will be unavailable unless the petitioner "is in custody in viola-
tion of the Constitution,"9' uniform application of the habeas corpus
statutes would seem to be essential . 2 The Court in Lefkowitz ad-
vanced no overriding explanation, however, why federal law should
vary because states have chosen diverse guilty plea procedures. Al-
though the Supreme Court has often indicated a desire to give the
states maximum leeway in the development of their own criminal
procedures," Lefkowitz is the first instance where the Court has sug-
gested that a state's efforts can justify expanding federal habeas cor-
pus relief. The different standards that the Court now applies in
adjudicating the finality of a guilty plea create tension between
Lefkowitz and the Tollett-Brady trilogy decisions, and raise doubt as
to the direction of future Supreme Court decisions on the availability
of federal habeas corpus to defendants who plead guilty.
If Lefkowitz is limited to its facts, the Court will have carved out
only a small exception to prior law concerning federal habeas corpus
and guilty pleas. The majority's reliance upon an expectations ration-
ale" and its dependence on procedural reasoning at odds with pre-
vious decisions," however, suggest more extensive application. Be-
cause the finality of a guilty plea will no longer be determined solely
by its voluntariness and intelligence, the significance of Lefkowitz
may be that it can compromise the effects of the Tollett and Brady
trilogy decisions. Under the Tollett-Brady trilogy rationale, post-
conviction federal collateral relief is foreclosed to defendants who
plead guilty in ignorance of constitutional rights later declared and
held to be retroactive in effect. The defendant who pleaded guilty
consequently remains convicted, while the defendant who demanded
trial is freed, although the circumstances surrounding their cases may
" 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1970).
," There should be a strong federal policy in favor of a uniform application of the
habeas corpus statutes. Cf. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Byrd v. Blue Ridge
Electric Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
" See, e.g., Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972), where the Court stated that
the states are always free to make "their own law, to adopt a higher standard."
"See text accompanying notes 48-68 supra.
' See text accompanying notes 73-75 & 85-89 supra.
"See generally Note, The Guilty Plea as a Waiver of "Present But Unknowable"
Constitutional Rights: the Aftermath of the Brady Trilogy, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1434
(1974). In McMann, for example, had the defendants proceeded to trial instead of
pleading guilty, their convictions would have been overturned because New York un-
constitutionally permitted the jury to evaluate the voluntariness of their confessions.
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). By pleading guilty, the defendants in McMann
remained convicted.
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have been identical. The decision in Lefkowitz may have ameliorated
such a result.9
Regardless of its future effects, Lefkowitz has undercut developed
doctrines relating to guilty pleas. The majority neglected the gravity
of an admission of guilt made in open court, a point repeatedly em-
phasized throughout a half-century of Supreme Court decisions.9"
Instead of a solemn admission of guilt which is itself a conviction,99
the Court viewed Newsome's plea as essentially a resource saver for
the state and a means through which the accused preserves appellate
review of pretrial motions.109 More important, the Court dismissed
the doctrines relating. to a voluntary and intelligent guilty plea as
"simply inapposite." To ignore those doctrines because New York has
chosen to permit appellate review of pretrial motions notwithstand-
ing a guilty plea is inconsistent with the treatment and development
of those doctrines in the Brady trilogy and Tollett cases.
By substituting procedural notions and the state's and defen-
dant's expectations for the developed doctrines concerning the effects
of valid guilty pleas, the Court has sanctioned state prescription of
federal collateral relief and nonuniform application of the federal
habeas corpus statutes. The Court's denigration of the solemnity and
finality of a guilty plea, and its reliance on arguments equally appli-
cable to states without New York's guilty plea procedure' indicate
" See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974), where similar considerations may
have led the Court to affirm the grant of habeas corpus relief to a prisoner notwith-
standing his voluntary and intelligent guilty plea. In Blackledge, the defendant sought
relief on the ground that his indictment on a felony charge, after he had been convicted
of a lesser-included misdemeanor, functioned as a penalty for exercising his statutory
right to appeal the misdemeanor conviction, and was therefore in violation of the Due
Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court concluded that there was a
violation of due process, and discussed why the defendant's guilty plea would not
preclude him from habeas corpus relief:
While petitioners' reliance upon the Tollett opinion is understanda-
ble, there is a fundamental distinction between this case and that one.
Although the underlying claims presented in Tollett and the Brady
trilogy were of constitutional dimensions, none went to the very power
of the State to bring the defendant into court to answer the charge
brought against him.
Id. at 30. As Mr. Justice Rehnquist pointed out in dissent, however, without a valid
indictment the state in Tollett also lacked the power to bring the defendant into court.
Id. at 35. Whether the faulty indictment could have been corrected was irrelevant since
no correction was made.
" See note 32 supra.
" Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927).
11 420 U.S. at 289.
"I See notes 62, 73, & 88 supra.
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that the heretofore impenetrable bar created by a voluntary and in-
telligent guilty plea may now be-subject to reconsideration." 2 While
the Lefkowitz decision has thus unsettled previously confirmed law
without providing a sound alternative, narrow construction of the
Court's procedural view would ease the conflict with the substantive
law set out in Tollett and the Brady trilogy. This course would best
avoid casting further doubt on doctrines in the areas of federal habeas
corpus and guilty pleas which prior to Lefkowitz were well estab-
lished, and would reconcile the rationales to a more peaceful, if some-
what uncomfortable, coexistence.
WiLUAM R. BALDWIN, HI
11 See text accompanying notes 93-97 supra.

